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A Rejoinder
JAMES A. RAHL
Mr. Baker states that the purpose of the Sherman Act does not
extend to the protection of foreign buyers against horizontal restraints
by American firms who collaborate in selling abroad. The Webb-
Pomerene exemption is largely unnecessary, partly because "most joint
export arrangements could be carried out under the Sherman Act."' It
is up to foreign governments, he argues, if they choose, to attack these
arrangements. The Justice Department Memorandum embodies a simi-
lar idea.2
My paper indicates a belief that the Act applies to such restraints
regardless of the nationality of the buyers affected, if the restraint of
competition is carried out in the course of U.S. export commerce, or if
it substantially affects such commerce. This "misses the real world," he
says, and represents "vague internationalism. '3 Perhaps we do differ
on our perception of the real world and of what constitutes good U.S.
international policy. My paper, however, was an effort to state what the
law is, or seems to be, as a guide to those who practice it. As I
understand him, Mr. Baker does not argue that such arrangements do
not fall within the reach of the Sherman Act: the issue is "not one of
jurisdiction," he says.4 Thus he agrees with the main part of my paper,
though not discussing the particular tests ofjurisdiction which I under-
take to state.
The point stands, therefore, that the courts may examine under the
Sherman Act the legality of market allocation, price fixing, boycotts,
tying arrangements and other restraints upon foreign buyers, if carried
on by American exporters, absent a Webb-Pomerene exemption. This
1. Baker, Antitrust and World Trade: Tempest in an International Teapot?, 8 CORNELL INT'L
L.J. 16, 28 (1974).
2. Justice Department Memorandum, reprinted in 5 CCH TRADE REG. REP. 50,129, at
55,208 (1974).
3. Baker, supra note 1, at 34, 35.
4. Id at 37.
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application of the law may be made in private suits and Federal Trade
Commission proceedings, even where the Justice Department decides
not to act-a major circumstance not discussed in Mr. Baker's paper.
Since these papers were written, a District Judge in a private suit,
Todhunter-Mitchell & Co. v. Anheuser-Busch, Inc.,5 has held the Act
applicable and violated where an American exporter was carrying out a
plan of territorial confinement of American and foreign distributors,
the anti-competitive impact of which, insofar as plaintiff was con-
cerned, was upon foreign buyers in a foreign market.
The question remains as to what kind of rules will apply. I do not
disagree that reasonableness tests might be appropriate in some cases
where per se rules would be applied in similar cases domestically,
although I know of no case which supports this. But I have difficulty in
understanding Mr. Baker's concept of reasonableness. He indicates
that under the rule of reason, one may justify what would otherwise be
prohibited, where this will serve the "national interest" in increasing
exports, and combatting foreign cartels and other foreign market
obstacles. It is here that I think the Timken case relevant.6 To me, it
holds that the concern of the Act is with protecting competition in
foreign commerce and that the Act does not permit justification of
,restraints of competition on the ground that such restraints would be
more effective in doing business abroad. If that is not the holding, the
point remains that decades of interpretation in other cases have ruled
out the argument that the Act should not be applied because some
other system besides competition arguably would work better.
The idea that the United States should tolerate export cartels formed
at home to prey upon foreign markets, and leave it to foreigners to
protect themselves, provided there is no domestic "spillover," raises
many objections. First, "spillover" is difficult to avoid in the "real
world," and an antitrust policy which encourages it invites some serious
problems. Second, the idea overlooks the presence of many American
firms and individuals in foreign markets. Thus, there may be "foreign
spillover" onto the Americans Mr. Baker wishes to protect. Third,
other nations, both developed and developing, may have no practical
antitrust remedy. It is far easier to stop restraint at its source than to
5. 375 F. Supp. 610 (E.D. Penn. 1974),findings amended, 5 CCH TRADE REG. REP.
(1974-1 Trade Gas.) 75,359.
6. Timken Roller Bearing Co. v. United States, 341 U.S. 593 (1951). See Rahl, American
Antitrust and Foreign Operations: What is Covered?, CORNELL INT'L L.J. 1, 9 (1974);
Baker, supra note 1, at 35-7.
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overcome the complex problems of obtaining personal jurisdiction over
foreign parties and of writing and enforcing decrees for them.
Fourth, such a U.S. policy on the part of the nation claiming to be
the great proponent of antitrust invites costly emulation. Our Webb-
Pomerene Act is often used as an excuse for foreign toleration of
export cartels, and I should think that Mr. Baker's views will provide
further justification. Fifth, such a policy invites retaliation, as Mr. Baker
himself illustrates by defending under some circumstances American
buying groups formed to counteract foreign export cartels.7
We can attack the foreign cartels under our law, and they can attack
ours. But why encourage their formation in the first place? And how
would we look attacking a foreign buying group formed to protect
against an American export cartel formed with our blessing? This
seems neither a pretty picture, nor a policy which will serve well the
national interest.
7. Baker, supra note I, at 25.
